УДК 316.4 DOI: 10.18523/2617-9067.2020.3.3-14

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THE ATTITUDE OF UKRAINE'S POPULATION TO RUSSIA AND RUSSIA'S POPULATION TO UKRAINE (2008–2020)

The paper accumulates the results of the joint project of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and the Russian center for the study of public opinion "Yuri Levada Analytical Center" (Levada-Center). The project started in 2008. Every three months, KIIS inserts in its omnibus survey the questions about the attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia, and Levada-Center on the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine. In total, 34 surveys were conducted in each country, with samples of about 2,000 Ukrainians and about 1,600 Russians (about 68,000 of Ukrainians and 54,000 of Russians were surveyed during the entire period of the project). The data are representative of the population in each of the countries aged 18 years and above. In Ukraine, after 2014, surveys were conducted only in the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine.

The attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia from 2008 to May 2014 can be called unrequited love. During this period, in different years, from 80 % to 90 % of Ukrainians treated Russia positively, and the proportion of Russians who favored Ukraine ranged from 30 % to 70 %.

The collapse of the positive attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia began after the annexation of the Crimea and continued after the beginning of the war in the Donbass; by March 2015, only 30% of Ukrainians had a positive attitude to Russia. However, after the end of the active hostilities, a positive attitude towards Russia was gradually restored, and by February 2020, more than 50% of Ukrainians had a positive attitude towards Russia. At the same time, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine after the annexation of the Crimea also worsened. During all the period of observation, Ukrainians treated Russia better than Russians treated Ukraine.

Besides the question about the attitude towards Russia as a whole, we also asked separate questions about the attitude to the government of Russia and to the population of Russia.

Keywords: Attitude towards Russia, Attitude towards Ukraine, Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Ukrainian-Russian Conflict, Ukrainian-Russian War, Dynamics of Public Opinion.

Introduction

The paper is intended to summarize the results of the joint project of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion "Yuri Levada Analytical Center" (Levada-Center)¹. The project started in 2008. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and the Levada-Center studied the attitude of the citizens of their country to their neighbors until 2008, but in 2008 I suggested that Alexey Grazhdankin made the questions completely identical and synchronized our polls. Every three months, KIIS includes in its omnibus survey the questions about the attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia and Russians, and the Levada-Center - about the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. The main task of the article is to provide an opportunity for an acquaintance with the available data, all of which are available in the National Open Social Studies Data Bank for analysis.

Data and Methodology

In total, 34 surveys were conducted in each country, with samples of about 2,000 Ukrainians and about 1,600 Russians (about 68,000 Ukrainians and 54,000 Russians were surveyed during the entire period of the project). The data are representative of the population in each of the countries aged 18 years and above. In Ukraine, after 2014, surveys were conducted only in the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine.

The latest nationwide survey was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on February 8th – February 18th, 2020. The data were collected from 2,038 respondents living in 110 settlements (PSU) in all regions of Ukraine (except for the AR of the Crimea) with the method of personal interviewing. The sample was stochastic, 4-staged, with quota selection on the last stage, and it is representative of the population of Ukraine aged 18 and above. In Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts the survey was conducted only in

¹ That paper is based on the report presented at ASN World Convention 2019, Columbia University, May 2-4, 2019.

the territories that are controlled by the Ukrainian government.

The statistical sampling error (with the probability of 0.95 and for a design effect of 1.5) does not exceed the following figures: 3.3 % for the indicators around 50 %, 2.8 % for the indicators around 25 %, 2.0 % for the indicators around 10 %, and 1.4 % for the indicators around 5 %.

The methodology of other studies of KIIS is the same as the research of February 2020 (the only difference is the scope of the covered territory: after May 2014 the researchers did not include the Crimea, and since 2015 they did not include the part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are not controlled by Ukraine).

The Levada-Center survey was conducted throughout all of Russia in both urban and rural settings, on January 15th – January 20th, 2020. The survey was carried out among 1,600 people over the age of 18 in 137 localities of 50 subjects of the Russian Federation. The survey was conducted as a personal interview in respondents' homes.

The statistical error for a sample of 1,600 people (with the probability of 0.95) does not exceed the following figures: 3.4 % for the indicators around 50 %, 2.9 % for the indicators around 25 %, 2.0 % for the indicators around 10 %, and 1.5 % for the indicators around 5 %. Other Levada-Center studies were conducted with the same methodology.

In each of these studies, two questions were asked:

Russians to Ukraine over the entire period of observation (see Chart).

The attitude of Ukrainians to Russia from 2008 (and, perhaps, earlier) until May 2014 can be called "unrequited love" (see Table 1).

During this period, in different years, from 80 % to 90 % of Ukrainians had a positive attitude to Russia, and the proportion of Russians who had a positive attitude to Ukraine ranged from 30 % to 70 %. For example, after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine deteriorated significantly; by January 2009, only 29 % of Russians kept a positive opinion about Ukraine (62 % were negative, 10 % were undecided), whilst 90 % of Ukrainians continued to treat Russia positively.

What might be an explanation behind? In my opinion, the following hypotheses may be stated here. The positive attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia from 2008 (and most likely before) to 2013 might be explained by the inartificial attitude towards the fraternal (in the positive sense of the word²) people, who up to the historical life experience of most Ukrainians were perceived as the people of the same country they lived in almost 30 years before. During this period, 15-20 % of the population of Ukraine wanted to unite with Russia into one state, while the rest supported the independence of Ukraine, but 70 % wanted special relations with Russia without visas and customs.

"What type of the relations between Ukraine and Russia would you prefer?" (One answer)

Relations should be the same as with other countries: with closed borders, visa, and customs	1
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states: with no visa, no customs and with open borders	2
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one country	3
HARD TO SAY/DO NOT KNOW	9

"What is your general attitude toward Russia now?" (the question for Ukrainians), and the questions for Russians was: "What is your general attitude toward Ukraine now?"

very positive	1	mostly negative	3	HARD TO SAY / DENIAL FROM ANSWERING	0
mostly positive	2	very negative	4	HARD TO SAY / DENIAL FROM ANSWERING	9

In addition, during the project, every few years, the following questions were also asked: "What is your general attitude toward Russians (residents of Russia)?" (the question for Ukrainians), and "What is your general attitude toward the government of Russia?" With the same answer options (very positive; mostly positive; hard to say; mostly negative, very negative).

Results

What is bringing the attention first is that Ukrainians had a better attitude toward Russia than

In 2008, different political forces in Ukraine took different positions towards the Russian-Georgian war, and the mass media (belonging to different oligarchs) gave different assessments of

² Now the word "fraternity" towards Russians has for Ukrainians rather negative connotations (especially, in combination "elder brother"). More approximate is the association from the Felix Krivin's story.

[&]quot;Already at the dawn of history half of humanity was destroyed: Cain killed Abel".

Then peaceful days flowed. Cain turned out to be a practical landlord: he quickly mastered the land property and settled it with his abundant offspring. And to his children, who could not appreciate all this, Cain often said:

[&]quot;Take care, children, of this world for which your uncle died!"




Chart. Dynamics of the positive attitude of the population of Ukraine to Russia and of the population of Russia to Ukraine (% of those who are positive or very positive about the other country)

the events taking place, therefore the population of Ukraine, as a whole did not change its positive attitude towards Russia.

I find it more difficult to formulate hypotheses in relation to the population of Russia; they are based on consultations with my Moscow and St. Petersburg colleagues, and are as follows. Unlike Ukrainians, Russians, due to various reasons, treat the sense of "belonging to the Great country" as an essential and substantial value, Ukraine is seen as the entity that should be a part of this "Great country", the process of the collapse of the USSR and the formation of independent states is not considered, in particular, as the creation of independent states, Ukraine and Russia, but as a separation of Ukraine from Russia. Since Ukrainians separated from Russia, they are to some extent treated as "traitors" in the minds of the majority of Russians, and therefore the attitude towards Ukrainians after 1991 is worse than the attitude of Ukrainians towards Russians (and the attitude towards citizens, as will be seen below, dominates as a component of the attitude to the country in general).

The second reason for "unrequited love" existence can be the deliberate activity of the mass media, primarily television, which for Russians (as well as for Ukrainians) is the main source of information. As far as I know, opposition television channels are almost absent in the daily television watching of the overwhelming majority of Russians, while the remaining channels are controlled on many issues (including geopolitical ones) from a single center. The well-known Russian journalist Yevgeny Kisilev, who worked in Russia until 2009 (he was the general director of NTV), said that the main principle of giving news about Ukraine resembled the principle of talking about the deceased, but only vice versa: bad or nothing.

The collapse of the positive attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia began after the annexation of the Crimea and continued after the start of the war in the Donbas; by March 2015 only 30 % of Ukrainians had a positive attitude to Russia. However, after the end of the "hot" phase of military actions, the positive attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia had been gradually restored, and by February 2020, 54 % of Ukrainians had a positive attitude towards Russia.

What could be the reason explaining the significant improvement in the attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia and Russians, which occurred during the last year? One of the possible hypotheses is an assumption that the election campaign conjoined with the revitalization and activation of the work of pro-Russian political forces and massmedia (first of all television) channels. Foremost, the information war of Russia against Ukraine continues. The chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in an article written a year before the annexation of Crimea, wrote that non-military measures in a modern war constitute 80 % of all resources, and the military only 20 %; non-military methods include "the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a standing front throughout the territory of the opposing state, as well as a permanent informational impact" (Gerasimov, 2013, February 26)³. Part of the population continues to watch Russian TV channels and use Russian social networks, and some Ukrainian channels belong to the pro-Russian opposition. The survey which was conducted by KIIS on demand of the Detector Media showed an increase in the support of the set of Russian propaganda statements for the last year. For example: (1) support for the statement that the war was started not by Russia but by the Ukrainian government, increased from 15% to 17%; (2) support for the declaration that the Russianspeaking citizens were prosecuted in Ukraine increased from 10 % to 16 %, etc.)⁴. Secondly, the political struggle intensified in connection with the presidential election. If in all previous elections the struggle was between pro-European and pro-Russian candidates, now the struggle between pro-European candidates was even tougher than between pro-European and pro-Russian. Mutual accusations declared by the leaders of the presidential race Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, Grytsenko and others led to the significant decline of trust both to the authorities and the opposition; by December 2018 only about 20 % trusted the opposition, 16 % trusted the President, 11 % trusted the government, and 8 % trusted the parliament. This also reduced the credibility of information about the hostile actions of Russia against Ukraine, coming from the authorities.

At the same time, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine after the annexation of the Crimea deteriorated also (the minimum was 24 %). However, even after the end of active military combat operations, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine did not significantly improve. The positive attitude of Russians towards Ukraine varied within the margin of sampling error and was just a bit over 30 %. Perhaps this is also explained due to the deliberate activity of the mass media and its influence, television above all: in Russia, the negative information with regard to Ukraine is provided consistently and purposefully, therefore the public opinion is more manageable. Only once during the last 12 years did the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine become slightly better than that of Ukrainians towards Russia: in September 2019, after the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. At that time, 56 % of Russians were well disposed towards Ukraine and 54 % of Ukrainians were well disposed towards Russia (however, this difference is statistically insignificant). Apparently, this is explained by the hopes of Russians that the new government will be more pro-Russian than the previous one. By January 2020, the percentage of Russians, sympathizers of Ukraine fell to 40 %. Thus, as has been indicated earlier, Ukrainians treated Russia better than Russians treated Ukraine practically throughout the entire observation period.

A general attitude to the country is an integral evaluation which summarizes the attitudes to certain characteristics of this country and the attitudes to various aspects of relations between the countries. What is the attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia as a country? We did not have the opportunity to study this issue in all possible details. However, as has been stated earlier, besides the question about the attitude towards Russia as a whole, we also asked the separate questions about the attitude to the government of Russia and to the population of Russia. The survey conducted in February 2019 demonstrated that 77 % of Ukrainians favored Russians (citizens of Russia), 13 % had a positive attitude to the government of Russia (mainly due to the East and Donbass part of the sample). Similar pattern of attitude was demonstrated by the survey in Russia: 82 % of Russians treated Ukrainians (the citizens of Ukraine) positively, and the leadership of Ukraine was treated positively by only 7 % of the population.

Russians's attitude to Ukrainians was by 7-percentage points better than the attitude of Ukrainians to Russians. The correlation coefficient between the attitude toward Russia and the attitude toward the residents of Russia is 0.474, and the correlation between the attitude toward Russia and the attitude toward the government of Russia is 0.189. The regression equation in which the attitude to Russia is a dependent variable (AR), and the attitude to Russian citizens (ARC) and the attitude to the Russian government (ARG) are independent variables, has $R^2 = 0.236$, and the equation coefficients are as follow: AR = 0.49 * ARC + 0.11 * ARG + 1.5. The regression coefficient of the attitude to Russian citizens (ARC) is almost 5 times higher than the contribution of the regression coefficient of the attitude to government.

Thus, the positive attitude of Ukrainians to Russia is mainly correlated with the positive attitude

³ https://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632

⁴ https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id= 839&page=1

towards Russians (as well, the positive attitude of Russians towards Ukraine is correlated with the positive attitude to Ukrainians).

The attitude of Ukrainians to Russia significantly depends on the region: in the West, 41 % have a positive attitude to Russia, 51 % in the Central region, 70 % in the South, and 75 % in the East (see Table 1). The same regional differentiation pattern applies to the attitudes towards the government of Russia and Russians.

At the same time, compared with February 2019, the number of those who wanted closed borders with Russia has not changed (39 %), and the number of those who want independent relations, but without borders and customs, slightly increased (from 48 % to 51 %). In 2020, only 3 % of the polled Ukrainian citizens want to unite in one country with the Russian Federation (compared with 4 % in February 2019, the difference is not statistically significant).

 Table 1. Percentage of those who have positive ("generally positive" and "very positive") attitudes to Russia, Russians, the government of Russia, February 2019, %

	Positive ("generally positive" or "very positive") attitude to						
Region*	Russia	Government of Russia	Russians				
Western	41	4	71				
Central	51	11	70				
Southern	70	14	85				
Eastern	75	34	87				
Ukraine	57	13	77				

* Composition of the regions of Ukraine: Western macroregion – Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopilska, Khmelnytska, Chernivetska oblasts (regions); Central macroregion – Kyiv city, Kyivska, Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Kirovohradska, Poltavska, Sumska, Cherkaska, Chernihivska oblasts; South macroregion – Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka, Mykolaivska, Odeska, Khersonska oblasts; Eastern macroregion – Kharkivska, Donetska, Luhanska oblasts (only regions controlled by Ukraine).

"What type of the relations between Ukraine and Russia would you prefer?" is another question that was asked during the implementation of the project. The support of the independence of Ukraine is an indicator which is counted as the sum of percentages for alternatives "generally positive" and "very positive" for the questions "Relations should be the same as with other countries: with closed borders, visa, and customs" (1) and "Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states: with no visa, no customs and with open borders" (2). In February 2020, the support of independence of Ukraine was declared by the 90 % of the population. Compared with February 2019, for the last year the support of independence of Ukraine remains stable up to the general trend: 90 % of the population believe that Ukraine should be an independent state.

As for Russians, the number of people willing to have closed borders with Ukraine (26 %) is much less than the number of Ukrainians willing to have closed borders with Ukraine: 39 %. Compared to February 2019, the number of Russians willing to unite in one country with Ukraine slightly decreased (from 17 % to 15 %), but was still much higher than the number of Ukrainians willing to unite in one country with Russia (3 %).

In addition to the regular questions from the joint monitoring of Levada-Center and KIIS about the relation to the neighboring country and the borders, in September 2018, parallel questions were raised. These questions were asked in order to assess the human qualities of the representatives of their own ethnic majority and of the ethnic majority of those living in the neighboring state. In particular, in

 Table 2. What do you think, which of the above qualities are the most characteristic of Russians and Ukrainians, September 2018, %

Characteristic	Data o	f KIIS	Data of Levada-Center		
treats	Residents of Ukraine about "Ukrainians"	Residents of Ukraine about "Russians"	Residents of Russia about "Russians"	Residents of Russia about "Ukrainians"	
Hospitable	48	21	65	26	
Ready to help	18	10	43	7	
Cultural, educated	10	8	22	6	
Silent, humiliated	7	7	3	6	
Envious	6	10	3	22	
Lazy	4	15	14	12	
Arrogant	2	9	1	14	
Hungry for power	1	9	3	9	
Brutal	1	8	2	11	

Ukraine, the following questions were asked: "What do you think, which of the above qualities are the most characteristic of Russians (the residents of Russia)?", and "What do you think, which of the above qualities are most characteristic of Ukrainians (the residents of Ukraine)?" Similar questions were asked in Russia. The results are shown in Table 2.

As one can see, when self-assessing Ukrainians, Ukrainians rely on positive qualities. More surprisingly, the first two qualities in Ukrainians' assessment of Russians are also positive (open, simple, and hospitable). In general, 6 positive and 4 negative traits of Russians were named.

Russians named 5 positive and 5 negative traits of Ukrainians.

As one can see, all treats of Russians among those self-esteemed are positive, and especially highly Russians appreciate their hospitality (65 %), openness (58 %) and peacefulness (54 %).

In general, it can be said that Ukrainians are more critical to themselves than Russians: the average percentage in self-assessments of the first 10 positive qualities for Ukrainians is 27 %, while in Russians' estimates it is one and a half times bigger: 42 %. Also, a higher percentage of Russians named the negative qualities of Ukrainians (the sum of the percentages of the negative qualities that were named out of the above 10 qualities is 101 %) than the percentage of Ukrainians who named the negative qualities of Russians (a similar percentage: 51 %).

Conclusion

The joint research monitoring conducted by KIIS and the Levada-Center demonstrated with the reliable level of the data quality the following:

Ukrainians have a more positive attitude to Russians than Russians to Ukrainians.

After the annexation of the Crimea and militant combatant actions in Donbas, the positive attitude to

Russia "fell down", albeit it had improved for the last years.

What is the reason for the revealed results remains partially unclear; some hypotheses are put forward in the presented article, though the delivered justifications of hypotheses can hardly be considered the evidence. The integral analysis of the above results is still the matter of further research.

One of the reasons for the lack of evidence is that we did not analyze the dynamics of the media content, especially television broadcasts which, according to our polls, are the main source of news and its interpretation for the population of both Russia and Ukraine. KIIS itself finances the Ukrainian part of the project from the profit obtained in the course of commercial research during 12 years, and we cannot increase the costs of media analysis.

The main task of the article is not so much to get answers to the questions asked, as to provide an opportunity for an acquaintance with the available data, all of which are available for analysis after being transferred to the National Open Social Studies Data Bank (founded by KIIS, and now hosted by the Social Indicators Center with support of KIIS), see https://ukraine.survey-archive.com/.

Outside the article, there is also the question of how dangerous is for Ukraine the improvement of the population's attitude towards the aggressor, since the country exists under the conditions of the continuing aggression of Russia. Or maybe a positive side of this is that a good attitude toward Russians (with a clear separation of attitudes towards Russians and the government of Russia) will help in the future, after the cessation of the aggression, to establish good-neighborly relations with Russia? In my personal opinion, it seems that under the conditions when 85 % of Russians support the annexation of the Crimea, the improvement in attitudes towards Russians and Russia is more negative than positive for Ukraine.

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Appendices

TABLES

ATTITUDE IN UKRAINE TO RUSSIA, %			ATTITUDE IN RUSSIA TO UKRAINE, %				2, %		
Date	very positive/ mostly positive	mostly negative/ very negative	HARD TO SAY	TOTAL	Date	very positive/ mostly positive	mostly negative/ very negative	HARD TO SAY	TOTAL
Apr. 08	88	7	5	100	Mar. 08	55	33	12	100
Sep. 08	88	9	3	100	Sep. 08	38	53	10	100
Feb. 09	91	5	4	100	Jan. 09	29	62	10	100
May 09	93	4	3	100	May 09	33	56	11	100
Oct. 09	92	6	3	100	Sep. 09	46	44	10	100
Mar. 10	90	6	4	100	Mar. 10	59	29	12	100
Jun. 10	92	6	3	100	Jul. 10	70	22	9	100
Oct. 10	93	4	3	100	Oct. 10	67	21	12	100
Nov. 11	80	13	7	100	Sep. 11	68	23	9	100
Feb. 12	85	9	6	100	Jan. 12	64	25	12	100
Sep. 12	83	11	6	100	Sep. 12	74	17	10	100
Feb. 13	85	8	7	100	Feb. 13	69	21	9	100
May 13	81	10	9	100	May 13	72	18	9	100
Nov. 13	82	10	8	100	Sep. 13	69	22	8	100
Feb. 14	78	13	9	100	Jan. 14	66	26	9	100
May 14	52	38	10	100	May 14	35	49	17	100
Sep. 14	48	41	11	100	Sep. 14	32	55	13	100
Dec. 14	37	48	16	100	Jan. 15	24	63	13	100
Feb. 15	34	51	15	100	Mar. 15	31	56	13	100
May 15	30	56	14	100	May 15	26	59	14	100
Sep. 15	34	53	13	100	Sep. 15	33	56	11	100
Feb. 16	36	47	13	100	Feb. 16	27	59	14	100
May 16	42	43	15	100	May 16	39	47	13	100
Sep. 16	40	46	14	100	Sep. 16	26	56	17	100
Dec. 16	40	47	13	100	Dec. 16	34	54	13	100
Feb. 17	39	46	15	100	Jan. 17	34	54	13	100
May 17	44	37	19	100	May 17	26	59	15	100
Sep. 17	37	46	17	100	Sep. 17	32	53	15	100
Dec. 17	42	39	19	100	Dec. 17	28	56	17	100
Feb. 18	45	38	18	100	Mar. 18	33	55	12	100
Sep. 18	48	32	19	100	Sep. 18	33	56	12	100
Feb. 19	57	27	17	100	Feb. 19	34	55	10	100
Sep. 19	54	35	11	100	Sep. 19	56	31	13	100
Feb. 20	54	33	13	100	Jan. 20	41	47	11	100

Table 3. What is your general attitude toward Russia/Ukraine?

Table 4. What is your general attitude toward Russia? Distribution by regions, February 2020, %

	Ukraine in general, %	Western	Central	South	Eastern
Very positive	14	5	9	24	25
Mostly positive	40	33	38	44	55
Mostly negative	18	24	21	12	7
Very negative	15	27	16	7	4
HARD TO SAY/DENIAL FROM ANSWERING	13	10	17	14	9
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

	IN UKRAINE									
Date	Relations should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visa, and customs	Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with no visa, no customs and with open borders	Ukraine and Russia should unite in one country	Hard to say	Total					
Apr. 08	10	67	20	3	100					
Sep. 08	17	66	16	2	100					
Feb. 09	8	68	23	1	100					
May 09	10	65	23	2	100					
Oct. 09	11	67	19	3	100					
Mar. 10	11	67	19	3	100					
Jun. 10	12	70	16	2	100					
Oct. 10	10	67	20	2	100					
Nov. 11	13	67	16	1	100					
Feb. 12	13	69	16	2	100					
Sep. 12	11	72	14	3	100					
Feb. 13	13	68	16	3	100					
May 13	11	69	14	5	100					
Nov. 13	12	73	9	6	100					
Feb. 14	15	68	12	5	100					
May 14	32	54	8	5	100					
Sep. 14	45	44	5	6	100					
Dec. 14	50	42	3	5	100					
Feb. 15	48	43	4	6	100					
May 15	45	46	2	7	100					
Sep. 15	46	45	2	7	100					
Feb. 16	42	43	4	11	100					
May 16	44	44	3	9	100					
Sep. 16	49	43	3	6	100					
Dec. 16	45	46	3	7	100					
Feb. 17	47	43	2	7	100					
May 17	43	47	4	6	100					
Sep. 17	49	40	4	8	100					
Dec. 17	45	40	4	11	100					
Feb. 18	44	44	3	9	100					
Sep. 18	38	50	4	8	100					
Feb. 19	39	48	4	9	100					
Sep. 19	41	49	3	7	100					
Feb. 20	39	51	3	7	100					

Table 5.1. What type of relations of Ukraine with Russia would you prefer?

	IN RUSSIA									
Date	Relations should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visa, and customs	Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with no visa, no customs and with open borders	Ukraine and Russia should unite in one country	Hard to say	Total					
Mar. 08	19	56	19	6	100					
Sep. 08	24	52	13	11	100					
Jan. 09	29	51	12	8	100					
Jun. 09	25	55	14	6	100					
Sep. 09	25	55	13	7	100					
Jan. 10	25	55	14	6	100					
May 10	17	64	13	6	100					
Sep. 10	16	60	18	6	100					
Sep. 11	16	63	14	6	100					
Jan. 12	16	61	16	8	100					
Sep. 12	14	60	20	6	100					
Feb. 13	13	64	18	6	100					
May 13	19	58	15	8	100					
Sep. 13	23	55	16	6	100					
Jan. 14	19	59	16	6	100					
May 14	28	54	12	6	100					
Sep. 14	26	62	7	5	100					
Jan. 15	32	53	7	8	100					
May 15	30	54	10	6	100					
Sep. 15	25	59	8	7	100					
Feb. 16	32	52	11	5	100					
May 16	36	53	7	4	100					
Sep. 16	39	48	8	6	100					
Dec. 16	33	53	9	5	100					
Jan. 17	33	53	9	5	100					
May 17	35	50	9	5	100					
Sep. 17	34	49	11	6	100					
Dec. 17	33	49	10	8	100					
Mar. 18	39	45	10	5	100					
Sep. 2018	32	45	16	6	100					
Feb. 2019	25	52	17	6	100					
Sep. 19	23	54	19	4	100					
Jan. 20	26	56	15	3	100					

Table 5.2. What type of relations of Ukraine with Russia would you prefer?

	Ukraine in general, %	Western	Central	South	Eastern
Relations should be the same as with other countries	39	54	44	27	21
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states	51	39	43	61	72
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one country	3	1	3	5	4
HARD TO SAY, DENIAL FROM ANSWERING	7	6	10	7	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6. What type of relations of Ukraine with Russia would you prefer? Distribution by regions, February 2020, %

 Table 7. What is your general attitude toward the Russian government?
 (opinion of the residents of Ukraine – KIIS data)

	Sep. 14	May 16	Feb. 19
very positive	9	2	4
mostly positive	12	6	9
mostly negative	10	14	22
very negative	59	66	47
HARD TO SAY	10	12	18

Table 8. What is your general attitude toward the Russians (the residents of Russia)? (opinion of the residents of Ukraine – KIIS data)

	Sep. 14	May 16	Feb. 19
very positive	21	15	23
mostly positive	53	52	54
mostly negative	12	12	9
very negative	6	10	5
HARD TO SAY	8	12	9

LEVADA-CENTER DATA

 Table 9. What is your general attitude toward the Ukrainian government?
 (opinion of the residents of Russia – Levada-Center data)

	May 14	Sep. 14	Feb. 15	May 15	Sep. 15	Feb. 16	Feb. 19
very positive	3	1	1	1	1	2	1
mostly positive	9	7	5	5	4	2	6
mostly negative	29	39	33	27	32	29	21
very negative	50	47	56	59	55	58	64
HARD TO SAY	10	6	6	8	7	10	8

	Oct. 06	May 09	May 14	Sep. 14	Feb. 15	May 15	Sep. 15	Feb. 16	Feb. 19
very positive	10	7	22	9	13	14	11	8	25
mostly positive	71	68	59	52	50	50	52	51	57
mostly negative	11	15	10	21	19	18	18	19	8
very negative	2	3	2	5	6	7	7	8	5
HARD TO SAY	6	7	7	14	12	11	12	14	6

 Table 10. What is your general attitude toward the Ukrainians (the residents of Ukraine)?
 (opinion of the residents of Russia – Levada-Center data)

Data of Levada-Center Data of KIIS Residents Residents Residents Residents of Russia about of Russia about of Ukraine about of Ukraine about "the Ukrainians" "the Russians" "the Russians" "the Ukrainians" Irresponsible Hungry for power Hospitable Ready to help Brutal Silent, humiliated Envious Arrogant Cultural, educated Lazy Hypocritical, sly Peaceful Impose their customs on others Reliable, faithful Impractical Open, simple Respectful with the elders Rational Religious With the feeling of self-dignity Freedom-loving, independent Secretive Covetous Patient Hard-working Egoistic Energetic DIFFICULT TO SAY 13.7 19.6 10.4 13.3 Average percentage

Table 11. Comparative table with the qualities (September 2018)

Паніотто В. І.

СТАВЛЕННЯ НАСЕЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ ДО РОСІЇ ТА НАСЕЛЕННЯ РОСІЇ ДО УКРАЇНИ (2008–2020)

Статтю присвячено результатам спільного проєкту Київського міжнародного інституту соціології (КМІС) та російського центру вивчення громадської думки «Аналітичний центр Юрія Левади» (Левада-центр). Проєкт розпочався у 2008 р. Кожні три місяці КМІС вносить у загальнонаціональне опитування запитання про ставлення українців до Росії, а Левада-центр – про ставлення росіян до України. Загалом у кожній країні було проведено понад 34 опитувань, у кожній хвилі було опитано близько 2000 українців та близько 1600 росіян (під час проєкту було опитано близько 68 тис. українців та 54 тис. росіян).

Ставлення українців до Росії з 2008 р. (і, можливо, раніше) до травня 2014 р. можна назвати нерозділеним коханням. У цей період, у різні роки, від 80 % до 90 % українців ставилися до Росії позитивно, а частка росіян, які позитивно ставилися до України, становила від 30 % до 70 %. Наприклад, після російсько-грузинської війни в серпні 2008 р. ставлення росіян до України значно погіршилося; до січня 2009 р. лише 29 % росіян позитивно ставились до України (62 % – негативно, 10 % – складно відповісти), тоді як 90 % українців і далі ставилися позитивно до Росії.

Крах позитивного ставлення українців до Росії розпочався після анексії Криму і продовжився після початку війни на Донбасі, до березня 2015 р. лише 30 % українців мали позитивне ставлення до Росії. Однак після закінчення активних бойових дій позитивне ставлення до Росії поступово відновлювалось і до лютого 2020 р. понад 50 % українців позитивно ставились до Росії. Водночас ставлення росіян до України після анексії Криму також погіршилося. Практично, за весь період спостереження українці ставилися до Росії краще, ніж росіяни до України.

У статті також розглянуто результати опитування щодо ставлення окремо до керівництва кожної з країн та окремо до населення країн. Результати опитувань показують, що позитивне ставлення до країни пов'язано переважно зі ставленням до населення, а не до керівництва країни. У статті наведено також дані про те, які відносини між країнами хотіли б бачити громадяни – з візами та митницями, без віз і митниць або об'єднані в одну державу, а також думка громадян обох країн щодо того, які людські риси вони вважають типовими для росіян та українців.

Ключові слова: ставлення до Росії, ставлення до України, українсько-російські стосунки, українсько-російський конфлікт, українсько-російська війна, динаміка громадської думки.

Матеріал надійшов 26.04.2020



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